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clusive recovery feature of the worker's compensation statute.123
Also left unresolved by the Feldman court is the possibility of successive contribution claims by the defendant. The potential for
harassment of the third-party defendant in this situation has been
noted where a small incremental amount in excess of his apportioned share is loaned to the defendant. 124 Moreover, while a thirdparty provided the loan proceeds in Feldman, the court's rationale

would be applicable equally to cases in which the funds came directly from the plaintiff. In either case, the incentives for collusion

are great where the named tortfeasor is insolvent. Consequently,
the effect, if not the spirit of the Klinger rule, will be diminished
substantially by permitting a Feldman-type agreement.
Ellen R. Dunkin

ARTICLE 44-TRnLL MOTIONS
CPLR 4401: Dismissal of cross-claim for contribution unwarranted despite cross-claimant's opening statement exculpating
codefendants
A motion to dismiss a cause of action based on admissions in
the opening statements of counsel which effectively preclude recovery may be made pursuant to CPLR 4401.125 Although the statute
12 See note 122 supra.

See CPLR 5230, commentary at 37-38 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Successive
claims would occur if the court allowed for assertion of the contribution claim through a
"bucket brigade" approach. Id. at 37. This system of recovery applies where a defendant
already has paid his exact share of the judgment. Each additional dollar he pays is one over
and above his share and therefore collectible from the third-party defendant. Once the defendant collects that dollar, he can pay the plaintiff and thus, has another claim against the
third-party defendant. Id. Rather than require the defendant to assert one contribution
claim at a time, another commentator has postulated that the defendant may be entitled to
receive the full amount owing once he pays just one dollar. See WK&M I 1402.01a, at 14-94.
124

15 CPLR 4401 (1963) provides:

Any party may move for judgment with respect to a cause of action or issue upon
the ground that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after
the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such
cause of action or issue, or at any time on the basis of admissions.
Although not included expressly, dismissal on the basis of admissions in a counsel's opening
statement is within the purview of the statute. SEcoND RE. at 306; see CPLR 4401, commentary at 212 (1963). The practice of using the motion in this fashion is well established in
New York. See, e.g., Hoffman House v. Foote, 172 N.Y. 348, 356, 65 N.E. 169, 171 (1902);
Schaefer v. Karl, 43 App. Div. 2d 747, 747, 350 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (2d Dep't 1973);
Denenfeld v. Baumann, 40 App. Div. 502, 503, 58 N.Y.S. 110, 110 (1st Dep't 1899). Indeed,
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typically has been used by defendants to obtain dismissal of the
plaintiff's claim,12 the broad language of the statute appears to
contemplate that in multiparty litigation an admission in the opening remarks of defense counsel will support dismissal of a crossclaim as well. 127 Where dismissal of a cross-claim is sought, however, particularly a Dole cross-claim for contribution, 28 consideranotwithstanding that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action falls within
the ambit of CPLR 3211(a)(7), when the motion is predicated on admissions made by counsel, CPLR 4401 affords the proper procedural vehicle for seeking dismissal. See 4 WK&M
4016.14.
A dismissal based on counsel's opening statement may be predicated on any of three
theories: insufficient facts to state a cause of action, admissions in the answer sufficient to
negate as a matter of law an element necessary to the cause of action, or admissions or
statements of fact in the opening statement which irrebuttably destroy the case. Gilbert v.
Rothschild, 280 N.Y. 66, 70, 19 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1939); Hoffman House v. Foote, 172 N.Y.
348, 350, 65 N.E. 169, 169 (1902); 4 WK&M 4016.14. In order to justify dismissal, the
admissions should be of a kind "formally intended to be part of the pleadings," Martin
Fireproofing Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 45 Misc. 2d 354, 359, 257 N.Y.S.2d 100, 106 (Sup.
Ct. Erie County 1965), afl'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 910, 275 N.Y.S.2d 375 (4th Dep't 1966) (citing
Lloyd v. R.S.M. Corp., 251 N.Y. 318, 320, 167 N.E. 456, 456 (1929)), and not evidentiary in
nature such as inadvertent or inconclusive factual admissions. See Gracie Square Realty
Corp. v. Choice Realty Corp., 305 N.Y. 271, 278, 113 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1953); Lefler v. Clark,
247 App. Div. 402, 403-04, 287 N.Y.S. 476, 479 (1st Dep't 1936), SIEGEL § 402; 4 WK&M 1
4016.15. It is clear that the mere omission from the opening statement of elements necessary
to establish a prima facie case is not ordinarily grounds for dismissal. See Rivera v. Board of
Educ., 11 App. Div. 2d 7, 8-9, 201 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374-75 (1st Dep't 1960); Goodman v. Brooklyn Hebrew Orphan Asylum, 178 App. Div. 682, 685, 165 N.Y.S. 949, 951 (2d Dep't 1917).
Dismissal is proper only where counsel "deliberately and intentionally states or admits some
fact that, in any view of the case, is fatal to the action." Hoffman House v. Foote, 172 N.Y.
348, 351, 65 N.E. 169, 169 (1902).
128 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Rothschild, 280 N.Y. 66, 70, 19 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1939); Hoffman
House v. Foote, 172 N.Y. 348, 350-51, 65 N.E. 169, 169 (1902); Runkel v. City of New York,
282 App. Div. 173, 179, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485, 491 (2d Dep't 1953) (per curiam).
127 CPLR 4401 is not limited by its language to motions to dismiss the main action.
Motions to dismiss counterclaims, cross-claims, interpleader claims, and third-party claims
may all be cognizable under this provision. See SEcoND REP. at 306-08; 4 WK&M 1114016.14,
4401.01. Nevertheless, no case has been found which applies CPLR 4401 to a Dole crossclaim for contribution. But cf. Pine v. Solow, 69 App. Div. 2d 760, 760-61, 415 N.Y.S.2d 3, 5
(1st Dep't 1979) (admission in pretrial examination which exonerates codefendant not fatal
to cross-claim for contribution). Notably, it has been suggested that CPLR 4401 ought to be
a basis for dismissals of affirmative defenses as well. 4 WK&M 1 4016.14. But see In re
Humphrey, 191 App. Div. 291, 294-95, 181 N.Y.S. 169, 170-72 (1st Dep't 1920) (Smith, J.,
concurring).
128 A Dole claim for contribution is the hybrid result of the comingling of the concepts
of indemnification and contribution. See generally Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,
282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). It is referred to alternatively as a claim for "partial indemnification," id. at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386, or "relative contribution," Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 29, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (1972). Whereas a traditional cross-claim may be independent of the main
action and remain before the court even after dismissal of a plaintiff's case, see CPLR
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tion must be given to a party's dual role as defendant in the main
action and plaintiff on the cross-claim. Recently, in De Paolis v.
City of New York, 129 the Supreme Court, Kings County, emphasizing the dual capacity of the Dole cross-claimant, held that a defense counsel's opening statement which exculpated codefendants
did not justify dismissal of a cross-claim for contribution.180
In De Paolis, an automobile driven by Josephine Prestianni
collided at an intersection with a car owned by Rocco Schirripa
and operated by his son, Joseph.131 The plaintiff, a passenger in
the latter's vehicle, instituted a negligence action against the owners and operators of both cars to recover for personal injuries sustained in the accident.1 82 In addition, the plaintiff sued the City of
New York based on its negligent maintenance of a stop sign at the
intersection.133 Cross-claims for an allocation of liability were filed
by each defendant against all codefendants.'" At trial, notwithstanding its cross-claim against the Schirripas, the city declared in
its opening statement that the sole proximate cause of the collision
was Prestianni's negligent failure to stop at the corner.13 5 The at-

torney for the Schirripas thereupon moved for dismissal of the
city's cross-claim against them.13 6
3019(b) and commentary at 230 (1974), a contribution claim is ordinarily secondary in nature and dependent on the main action for its continued existence, see Tarantola v. Willians, 48 App. Div. 2d 552, 554, 371 N.Y.S.2d 136, 140 (2d Dep't 1975); Torrence v. Stenson,
87 Misc. 2d 697, 699, 386 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (Onondaga County Ct. 1976); 3 WK&M
3019.13.
Dole claims are accorded a significant degree of procedural latitude. This is attributable
in part to the notion that indemnification and contribution rights are essentially equitable
in character. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 465 F. Supp. 790,
794 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980); Blum v. Good Humor Corp., 57 App.
Div. 2d 911, 912, 394 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (2d Dep't 1977). Laches will rarely be a defense to a
Dole claim, and apportionment of liability may be made despite the failure to request it in
the pleadings. Howard v. Chalk, 58 App. Div. 2d 526, 526, 395 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (1st Dep't
1977); CPLR 3019, commentary at 260-62 (1974); see Caucci v. Fesko, 76 Misc. 2d 614, 349
N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973). Courts also allow Dole claims to be raised
before they technically accrue. See note 154 infra. For an analysis of the history of the
contribution doctrine in New York, see Note, The New Right of Relative Contribution:Dole
v. Dow Chem. Co., 37 ALBANY L. Rav. 154, 155 (1972); The Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REV.
185 (1972).
129 105 Misc. 2d 307, 432 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1980).
130 Id. at 311; 432 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
131 Id. at 308; 432 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.

135 Id.
13 Id.
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Justice Weisberg denied the motion and held that the remarks
by the city's counsel exculpating its codefendants did not justify
dismissal of the city's cross-claim for contribution.3 7 In so holding,
the court characterized as "the critical fact" the dual capacity in
which the city appeared.138 As a defendant in the main action, the
court noted, the city was trying to establish its freedom from liability.139 As a cross-claimant for contribution, on the other hand, it
was trying to establish the shared responsibility of its codefendants. 140 The inherent inconsistency in these postures persuaded the
court that the city's admission was a permissible "trial tactic." 41
In the court's view, the statement that only one codefendant
caused the accident was consistent with the city's denial of liability
in the main action, and therefore not a basis for dismissing the
cross-claims against the remaining defendants. 42 The court cautioned, however, that the same conclusion would not necessarily
have been reached if the cross-claim defendants, the Schirripas,
were not defendants in the main action, but rather had been im143
pleaded by the city.
The decision in De Paolis is significant for its creation of a
"permissible inconsistency" exception in the application of CPLR
4401 to admissions in the opening statement.1 44 If it is generally
"" Id. at 311; 432 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
13Id. at 310; 432 N.Y.S.2d at 324. Notably, the court rejected the city's contention that
it had made no admission of fact, finding that the admissions made by the city's counsel
would have been sufficient, in the absence of other factors, to warrant dismissal. Id.
"I Id. at 310; 432 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 310; 432 N.Y.S.2d at 324. Justice Weisberg pointed out that CPLR 1401 and
CPLR 1007 admit of certain inconsistencies. In particular, he noted, action for contribution
may be brought although it has not yet technically accrued. Id. at 310; 432 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
142 Id.
143

Id.

After initially determining that the opening statement of counsel included an admission of the type which would require dismissal of the defendant's cross-claim under the
Hoffman guidelines, the court distinguished the "context" in which the city's admission had
occurred, thus carving out an exception to Hoffman. Id. at 309-10, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25.
It is submitted, however, that the court did not need to create an exception to Hoffman
to resolve the case. It is suggested that the statements in De Paolis were not sufficient to
constitute a fatal admission under the criteria enunciated by Hoffman and its progeny. The
Hoffman court stated that in order to justify dismissal the admission in the opening must be
such that counsel's case is "completely ruined." 172 N.Y. 348, 350-51, 65 N.E. 169, 169
(1902). In De Paolis, it may be persuasively argued that counsel's statements were mere
assumptions as to the main action rather than fatal admissions regarding the cross-claim.
The distinction between admissions of fact and assumptions was discussed in Brick v. CohnHall-Marx Co., 283 N.Y. 99, 27 N.E.2d 518, 520 (1940). In Brick, the defendant sought dis14
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accepted, a defendant will not risk dismissal of his cross-claim for
contribution merely by making admissions in his opening state-

ment inconsistent with the maintenance of those claims. 14 5 As long
missal of a second action pursuant to the predecessor of CPLR 4401 based on an admission
in a prior action. Id. at 105, 27 N.E.2d at 521. In the prior action, the plaintiff had asserted
that a 6-year breach of contract statute of limitations applied. After dismissal, he reasserted
his claim under a theory of breach of covenant by declaring the contract was under seal.
The defendant argued that by asserting that the 6-year breach of contract statute of limitations applied in the prior action, plaintiff admitted that the contract was not under seal. Id.
at 102-03, 27 N.E.2d at 519-20. The Court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the
declaration of erroneous legal conclusions is not binding on a party. Id. at 105, 27 N.E.2d at
521. The Brick Court intimated that, at best, the admission could be used to attack credibility. Id. at 106, 27 N.E.2d at 521. The Court concluded that "assumptions for the purposes
of one suit [need not] be considered admissions in a second." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, it is submitted that it is consistent with Brick to apply the admissions in De Paolis
only to the main action. The contribution claim is, in reality, a separate "action" joined
merely for purposes of convenience. See Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 44 N.Y.2d 49,
375 N.E.2d 29, 32, 404 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1978); CPLR 1007, commentary at 11 (McKinney Supp.
1980).
Since the purpose of an opening statement is to convey to the court and jury the general nature and issues of the case, Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415 (1934), and
the admissions which form the basis of a CPLR 4401 motion should be intended as part of
the pleading, Martin Fireproofing Corp. v. Maryland Gas Co., 45 Misc. 2d 354, 359, 257
N.Y.S.2d 100, 106 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 910, 275 N.Y.S.2d 375
(4th Dep't 1966), the court could have buttressed its decision by analogizing to the treatment of admissions in the pleadings. Admissions in the pleadings are conclusive in the judicial proceeding in which they are made but only evidentiary in nature when offered in a
second action. E.g., Walsh v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 204 N.Y. 58, 66, 97 N.E. 408, 411
(1912); see FISCH, NEW YORK EvmENCE § 803 (2d ed. 1977); W. RIcHARDSON, EvIDENCE § 217
(10th ed. 1973); cf. Talbot v. Laubheim, 188 N.Y. 421, 425, 81 N.E. 163, 165 (1907) (admission in counterclaim submitted along with defendant's general denial in answer not conclusive in the main action since it pertains to counterclaim only). This supports the conclusion
in De Paolis. Since a Dole claim does not technically arise until after judgment is rendered,
see note 128 supra, an admission in the main action should not be fatal to the subsequently
accruing Dole claim. Cf. CPLR 3123(b) (admission of fact made at request of party to action
is limited in effect to pending action and does not constitute admission for any other purpose or proceeding).
145 It is submitted that the court's holding in De Paolisis inherently sound and should
be followed. In analogous situations, courts have long tolerated certain inconsistencies in
trial strategy in order to avoid prejudice to a party appearing in two capacities. For example, when a "servant" commits a tort while under the "master's" control, a plaintiff may sue
both the servant and the master jointly. In such a case, the master frequently is compelled
to assert his servant's lack of culpable conduct in order to defeat the plaintiff in the main
action. If this assertion were characterized as an "admission," the master could not require
the servant to indemnify him for damages awarded to the plaintiff. This dubious result, of
course, does not obtain. See Brady v. Stanley Weiss & Sons, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 241, 24445, 175 N.Y.S.2d 850, 854 (4th Dep't 1958); Ganley v. Kahn, 31 Misc. 2d 856, 857, 220
N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961).
In addition, the result in De Paolisis consistent with the general rule permitting hypothetical pleadings, see, e.g., Ganley v. Kahn, 31 Misc. 2d 856, 857, 220 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961), and, more particularly, the pleading of hypothetical cross-
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as his opening relates to his defense of the main action, he need
146
not fear that those statements may undermine his Dole status.
Indicative of the present judicial reluctance to dismiss a cause of
action on the basis of counsel's opening statement, "7 this approach

should prove particularly beneficial in multiparty tort cases. Indeed, to demand at the outset absolute consistency in trial strategy
in cases involving numerous parties varyingly related to each other
would require counsel for each party to devise a complex opening
in order to detail the nature of his claims without compromising
his right to assume different tactical postures as the trial
progressed. The De Paolis rule commendably avoids this problem
by limiting the binding effect of a party's admissions when he appears in a dual capacity.
Expressly left open in De Paolis is whether the same result
claims, see 50 New Walden, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 4, 5, 253 N.Y.S.2d 383,
385 (4th Dep't 1964)(per curiam); Brady v. Stanley Weiss & Sons, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 241,
244, 175 N.Y.S.2d 850 (4th Dep't 1958); 3 WK&M
3019.21. The oral admissions in De
Paolis, it is submitted, are in the nature of alternative pleadings.
"I It is suggested that a dismissal would be justified if the admission is inconsistent
with both the cross-claim and any defense in the main action. When the statements constituting the admission do not support any defense or theory of recovery, the De Paolisrationale should not apply.
147 See Hoffman House v. Foote, 172 N.Y. 348, 350-51,65 N.E. 169, 169 (1902); Schaefer v. Karl, 43 App. Div. 2d 747, 747, 350 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (2d Dep't 1973); Davidson v.
Hillcrest Gen. Hosp., 40 App. Div. 2d 693, 693, 336 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297 (2d Dep't 1972);
Malcolm v. Thomas, 207 App. Div. 230, 230, 201 N.Y.S. 849, 849 (2d Dep't 1923), aff'd
mem., 238 N.Y. 577, 144 N.E. 899 (1924); SIEGEL § 402. But see Gilbert v. Rothschild, 280
N.Y. 66, 19 N.E.2d 785 (1939); Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 898, 252 N.Y.S.2d
419 (2d Dep't 1964), afPd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 610, 224 N.E.2d 891, 278 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1967).
The power to dismiss based on an opening statement is exercised cautiously, with all doubts
resolved in favor of the party against whom dismissal is sought. Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1934); French v. Central N.Y. Power Corp., 275 App. Div. 238,
239, 89 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (4th Dep't 1949) (per curiam); see Schaefer v. Karl, 43 App. Div.
2d 747, 747, 350 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (2d Dep't 1973); Aesman v. Fox, 26 App. Div. 2d 739, 272
N.Y.S.2d 94, (3d Dep't 1966); Covell v. H.R.H. Constr. Corp., 24 App. Div. 2d 566, 262
N.Y.S.2d 370 (2d Dep't 1965), af/d, 17 N.Y.2d 709, 216 N.E.2d 710, 269 N.Y.S.2d 718
(1966).
Indeed, as a general rule, if there is any doubt as to the competency of a claim, courts
tend to permit introduction of all the evidence before they render judgment. SIEGEL § 402.
One advantage in this approach is that res judicata consequences will attach to the judgment. CPLR 5013 provides that dismissal before the close of a proponent's evidence is not
with prejudice unless specifically so stated. CPLR 5013 (1963). However, dismissal after the
close of a proponent's evidence will have res judicata effect. CPLR 5013 applies to thirdparty claims and cross-claims as well as plaintiff's main claim. See SIEGEL § 402; 5 WK&M
5013.01-.02. Thus, a dismissal based on the opening statements of counsel would most likely
not be on the merits. See Goodman v. Brooklyn Hebrew Orphan Asylum, 178 App. Div. 682,
165 N.Y.S. 949 (2d Dep't 1917); Steele v. Wells, 20 N.Y.S. 736 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1st Dep't
1892) (per curiam).
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would obtain if the parties seeking dismissal were third-party defendants impleaded by the city itself.148 Although the court intimated that a defendant who impleads a third party may risk dismissal under CPLR 4401 by making admissions in his opening
statement inconsistent with the Dole claim, 149 it is submitted that
the De Paolis rule should apply to all contribution claims irrespective of the form of their assertion.1 50 Apart from the mechanics of
interposing the claim, there is little difference between a crossclaim and a third-party claim for contribution.1 5 1 The mere fact
that a party has entered an action as a third-party defendant
rather than as a codefendant, it is submitted, is not a distinction
significant enough to justify denying him the tactical latitude afforded by the De Paolis rule.1 52 In either case, the defendant will
,,8 It may well be that in limiting the applicability of its holding, the court was suggesting that a defendant, contemplating impleader of a third party for contribution, is to be
charged with the responsibility of anticipating and minimizing his need to espouse conflicting theories of liability at trial. This reasoning, if indeed inferable from the court's intimation that disparate results may obtain depending on the nature of the claim to which the
4401 motion was addressed, ignores the substantial economic and equitable considerations
which militate in favor of adjudicating all liability in one proceeding. See generally SIEGEL §
155.
14 105 Misc. 2d at 310, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
150 Cf. Greenberg v. City of Yonkers, 45 App. Div. 2d 314, 318, 358 N.Y.S.2d 453, 457
(2d Dep't 1974), affd mem., 37 N.Y.2d 907, 340 N.E.2d 744, 378 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1975) (right
to indemnity not dependent on manner of assertion whether by cross-claim or independent
action). But see 2 WK&M 1007.04 (courts should be more reluctant to dismiss cross-claim
than third-party claim as long as dismissal without prejudice).
161 Prior to Dole, a third-party action was easily distinguishable from a cross-claim. A
third-party claim was available only for indemnity actions. A cross-claim could be used to
interpose a claim for contribution or indemnity, but, by its nature, it could not be served on
a party whom the plaintiff had not named as a codefendant. These propositions are no
longer true. See CPLR 1007, 3019(b). By eliminating many of the substantive distinctions
between contribution and indemnity, the Dole Court minimized the traditional differences
between the cross-claim and the third-party claim as well. See generally SIEGEL §§ 171, 227;
Note, The New Right of Relative Contribution:Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 37 ALBANY L. REv.
154 (1972). Nevertheless, a few distinctions remain. For example, a traditional cross-claim,
unlike a third-party claim, can contain causes of action which are unrelated to the main
action. See CPLR 3019(b); 3 WK&M %3019.14; SIEGEL § 227. A cross-claim may be filed
against a codefendant or a third party not previously named in the action, but a third-party
claim is not a proper means to assert an indemnity or contribution claim against a codefendant. 3 WK&M T 3019.18. It is submitted, however, that these distinctions do not justify
disparate application of CPLR 4401.
02 The way in which a claim for contribution or indemnification will be asserted often
depends solely on the plaintiff's decision regarding whom he will join as a party. SIEGEL §
227; 3 WK&M T 3019.18. Recognition of the inequities involved in allowing plaintiff's choice
to control led the Dole Court to extricate a tortfeasor's right to contribution from its dependence on whom the plaintiff elected to sue. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148-50,
282 N.E.2d 288, 292-93, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387-89 (1972). If an admission was held sufficient
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have the same strategic problems faced by the city in De Paolis.155
Furthermore, a distinction of this type might discourage certain
defendants from interposing their Dole claims at the trial of the
main action, thus frustrating the general policy favoring disposition of all Dole issues at one time.' In any event, however, since
the general availability of the permissible inconsistency exception
must abide by appellate case law, it is suggested that the trial bar
would do well to avoid making tactically unnecessary admissions in
their opening remarks regarding their right to contribution.
Donald Chase

COURT OF CLAIMS ACT

Ct. Cl. Act § 10: Filing of wrongful death claim prior to appointment as administratrix deemed jurisdictional defect requiring
dismissal
Section 10, subdivision 2 of the Court of Claims Act (the Act)
provides that a wrongful death claim against the state must be interposed "within 90 days after the appointment" of the decedent's
personal representative and within 2 years of the decedent's
death.1 5 5 In the past, the Court of Appeals has interpreted these
to justify dismissal under CPLR 4401 of a third-party claim but not a cross-claim, the effect
would be to resurrect the plaintiff's ability to control the substantive rights of defendants by
his choice of whom he will sue.
153 See text accompanying notes 139-142 supra.
I" Presently, a claim for contribution can be interposed in various forms: cross-claim,
third-party claim, counterclaim or separate action. CPLR 1403. Although technically a claim
for contribution does not accrue until after judgment has been rendered and payment made,
the courts permit the claim to be brought prematurely to avoid a multiplicity of suits and
procedural inefficiency. See Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 44 N.Y.2d 49, 375 N.E.2d
29, 404 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1978); Burgandy Basin Inn, Ltd. v. Watkins Glen Grand Prix Corp., 51
App. Div. 2d 140, 379 N.Y.S.2d 873 (4th Dep't 1976); CPLR 1007, commentary at 11 (McKinney Supp. 1980). Since the plaintiff can always opt to assert his contribution claim in a
separate action wherein he will not be handicapped by "wearing two hats," it is submitted
that in the name of procedural efficiency the court should not prejudice the defendant who
raises the issue in the main proceeding. Rather, the court should seek to discourage the
procedure of instituting a separate contribution action. Meckley v. Hertz Corp., 88 Misc. 2d
605, 388 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976).
185 Section 10(2) of the Court of Claims Act provides in pertinent partA claim by an executor or administrator of a decedent... shall be filed within
ninety days after the appointment of such executor or administrator, unless the
claimant shall within such time file a written notice of intention to file a claim
therefor in which event the claim shall be fied within two years after the death of

